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Piazza: Liability for the Injury and Destruction of Canines

UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXw1

LIABILITY FOR THE INJURY AND DESTRUCTION OF CANINES
The one absolutely unselfish friend that a man can have in this selfish
world, the one that never deserts him and the one that never proves
ungrateful or treacherousis his dog.,
Although the dog has been a functional member of society for over 9,000
years, 2 the legal status of the canine has remained a paradox. The traditional
view, equating the dog to inanimate property,3 seems inappropriate when one
considers the warmth and affection many feel for their animals. Even dog
owners, however, have divergent views of their animal's status; to one man a
dog is a mere object, while to another it is an unequaled companion. 4 One
need not debate the dog's status to appreciate the fact that millions of dollars
are spent annually buying, caring for, training, and showing dogs.5
Most legal commentaries have been devoted primarily to the liability of
the dog owner, 6 with little attention being directed to the rights of the owner.
Recent developments in Florida law, however, justify an analysis of the owner's
rights. The Florida courts have recognized that a special relationship exists
between a dog and its owner and have expanded the damage award to include
compensation for the owner's mental pain and suffering when injury to the
7
dog resulted from the defendant's malicious or wanton conduct.
To appreciate the significance of this extension, we should realize that
throughout history the law has not been kind to canines or their owners. At
common law the dog was not accorded the same protection as other domestic
animals, but rather was considered inferior property." He was viewed as a
useless creature, part wild and part domestic. Although the courts entertained
civil actions for injury or destruction of dogs, criminal sanctions were not imposed upon the wrongdoer." It was thought undesirable to burden the courts

1. Seidner v. Dill, 137 Ind. App. 177, 200-01, 206 N.E.2d 636, 647 (1965). Taken from the
closing argument of the plaintiff in an early Missouri case, this statement stands as a monument to trial eulogy. Although damages of only $222 were sought in this action for the
wanton killing of the plaintiff's dog, the jury was so moved by the argument that they
awarded the plaintiff $500 after two minutes of deliberation. Several members of the jury
felt the defendant should be hanged.
2. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Jan. 24, 1973, §E at 8, col. 1.
3. Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1896).
4. E. LEAvrrr, ANIMALS AND TIm LEGAL RIG-rrs 8 (Ist ed. 1968).
5. E. GREENE, THE LAW AND YouR DOG 5 (1969).
6. 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 848 (1969).
7. La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964); Levine v.
Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
8. Thiele v. City & County of Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 312 P.2d 786 (1957); Dog Owners
Ass'n v. Hilleboe, 206 Misc. 119, 124 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
9. Baer v. Tyler, 261 Mass. 138, 158 N.E. 536 (1927); Breedlove v. Hardy, 132 Va. 11,
110 S.E. 358 (1922).
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with such trifling matters, since dogs were considered to serve no practical
purpose.10 This view is amply illustrated by Blackstone:11
As to those animals which do not serve for food, and which therefore
the law holds to have no intrinsic value, as dogs of all sorts, and other
creatures kept for whim and pleasure, though a man may have a base
property therein, and maintain a civil action for the loss of them, yet
they are not of such estimation, as that the crime of stealing them
amounts to larceny.
The common law rule has been abrogated, however, and legislatures and
courts now accord the dog more legal protection. 2 In the past the Florida
statutes 3 provided that any dog owned and domiciled within the state was a
domestic animal and was protected in the same manner as other domestic
animals.14 Although this statutory provision has now been repealed,5 the legislature has indicated the same result may be reached under the general larceny
statute.10
Two recent Florida cases have indicated that dogs have the status of preferred property. In La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc. 7 damages were
awarded to the owner for mental pain and suffering that resulted from the
shock of finding the injured pet. In a later case, Levine v. Knowles, s the
Third District Court of Appeal allowed the owner to collect damages for
mental pain and suffering where a veterinarian disposed of the dog's body in
order to prevent an autopsy and a potential malpractice claim. These two
cases are the only significant decisions in the nation that reject the classical
view of the dog as mere property and adopt a more liberal, realistic view of the
dog's place in American society. The Florida position is unique in providing
more substantial rights for dog owners. In light of these developments, this
note presents and analyzes the law pertaining to rights of dog owners in
specific situations. Consideration centers upon the present legal environment
and the need for legislation in Florida.

10.

See E. GREENE, supra note 5, at 15. The common law courts felt the dog was a useless

carrier of disease and was kept for purposes consistent with its natural ferocity, thereby presenting danger to people and property.
11. 4 BLACMrONE, COMMENTARIES *286, quoted in State v. Sumner, 2 Ind. 377, 378 (1850).
12. Cases and statutes holding the dog is entitled to the status of property are too extensive for listing. For a discussion of the dog's property status see 3 C.J.S. 1085 (1936) and
authorities cited therein.
18. FLA. STAT. §811.19 (1971).

14. Other Florida statutes provide for the protection of animals. FLA. STAT. §§828.07-.08
(1971) (provide criminal penalties for the intentional poisoning of animals); FA. STAT.
§381.331 (1971) (outlines procedures for owners to follow when poisoning is suspected).

15. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-252, §2 (effective Oct. 1, 1972). The statute was repealed with
other specific criminal statutes.
16. FLA. STAT. §811.021 (Supp. 1972). See committee comment following Fla. Laws 1972,

ch. 72-252.
17. 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
18. 197 So. 2d 329 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
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In general, the law relevant to expulsion of trespassing dogs is parallel to
that governing the expulsion of trespassing humans. 9 Thus, the landowner
may use only such methods as are reasonably necessary to expel the trespassing
dog. 20 Furthermore, the use of force is clearly forbidden unless the animal is
engaging in activity more serious than simple trespass. 21 A rational justification
for this limitation upon resort to force may be based upon the grounds that
the dog is incapable of understanding the concept of private property. Rather
than place responsibility on the animal, the landowner should seek legal
22
redress against its owner.
Although in some situations a landowner may use force against an individual who declines to leave the property upon verbal request, 22 a dog's disregard of a verbal command would not justify the use of force against it.
Rather, the landowner must take further peaceful steps to rid himself of the
animal. The Mississippi supreme court, considering the extent of this requirement in Hull v. ScrUggs, 24 indicated to escape liability the landowner must, as
a minimum, make efforts to drive the dog away, using such means as will cause
the dog to stay away permanently. Further, the courts have held a landowner
25
cannot defend his actions on the grounds that his land was fenced or posted
or that the dog owner had been notified of the landowner's intent to destroy
2
any trespassing animal.
Further, if in addition to trespassing the canine is engaged only in trivial
offenses such as howling, 27 digging in flowers,28 or worrying the landowner's
animals, there is no justification for injury to the animal. 29 Nevertheless, use
of force is permissible if there are reasonable grounds to believe the dog's

19. Kling v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 633 (Ct. App. La. 1962); Bunn v.
Shaw, 3 N.J. 195, 69 A.2d 576 (1949).
20. Cases cited note 19 supra.
21. Seidner v. Dill, 137 Ind. App. 177, 206 N.E.2d 636 (1965); Wood v. Stotski, 148 Md.
508, 129 A. 646 (Ct. App. 1925); Trenka v. Moos, 118 Mont. 607, 168 P.2d 837 (1946); Bunn
v. Shaw, 3 N.J. 195, 69 A.2d 576 (1949); Scott v. Cates, 175 N.C. 336, 95 S.E. 551 (1918);
White v. State, 193 Tenn. 631, 249 S.W.2d 877 (1952).
22. Under FLA. STAT. §767.01 (1971), the liability of dog owners in Florida is absolute.
Therefore, where the owner must pay for damages caused by the dog, it is illogical to
destroy the animal. Thus, it follows that the individual destroying the dog should be legally
responsible for his actions.
23. E.g., Miller v. McGuire, 202 Ala. 361, 80 So. 433 (1918). This case illustrates the general principle that prior to the use of force a human trespasser must be asked to leave unless
such a request would be futile.
24. 191 Miss. 66, 2 So. 2d 543 (1941). The court set forth no criteria to determine what
constitutes appropriate action for a landowner in such a situation.
25. Harrington v. Hall, 22 Del. 72, 63 A. 875 (1906).
26. Hodges v. Causey, 77 Miss. 553, 26 So. 945 (1900).
27. McChesney v. Wilson, 132 Mich. 252, 93 N.W. 627 (1903).
28. Morgan v. Patin, 47 So. 2d 91 (Ct. App. La. 1950). This case concerned an injury to
a mule. The defendant asserted that injury to the animal was justified based upon the mule's
destruction of a flower bed. The court held such trivial offenses would not justify the injury.
29. See Hodges v. Causey, 77 Miss. 553, 26 So. 945 (1900).
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presence creates a real and imminent threat to the actor, his family, or valuable
property.3 0 When such a threat exists, traditional trespass law still limits the
landowner to the minimum force necessary to expel the animal.31 Further,
the landowner is not justified in destroying the dog unless there is substantial
32
necessity for doing so.
Where property is thus threatened or destroyed the analogy to the human

trespasser breaks down. Although human life may not be taken to protect
property,3 3 a dog may be destroyed under certain circumstances. First, a property owner may be justified in destroying a dog if the animal is presently

engaged in destructive action. 34 Where property has already been destroyed
the landowner's proper remedy lies with the courts and not self-help.A3 Second,
justification may exist if the relative value of the threatened property is large

in comparison to the value of the dog. 36 This relative valuation requirement
is feasible only where inanimate property is threatened. Where the endangered property is another animal, especially a pet, the relative value of
the two animals becomes irrelevant, 37 and the courts now hold the landowner
may take immediate protective action.

Although current case law provides broad parameters within which liability
for destruction of a trespassing dog can be determined, the actual result of any
given future case will probably hinge on its own particular facts. Except in
clear-cut cases of malicious destruction, the ultimate question of justification
will be decided by the trier of fact.
INJURY RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF VEHICLEs

Numerous animals are injured or killed daily as a result of driver negligence. Such drivers often fail to stop to ascertain the extent of the animal's
30. Allen v. Camp, 14 Ala. App. 341, 70 So. 290 (1915); Bunn v. Shaw, 3 NJ. 195, 69 A.2d
576 (1949).
31. Hughes v. Babcock, 849 Pa. 475, 37 A.2d 551 (1944). Of course, where humans are
concerned there is a greater concern for safety, but there is no apparent reason why the
same general principle of "reasonable force" would not apply to canine intruders.
52. Bunn v. Shaw, 8 NJ; 195, 69 A.2d 576 (1949).
33. See Boothe v. Barron, 131 So. 2d 621 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Anderson v. Jenkins, 220
Miss. 145, 70 So. 2d 535 (1954).
34. See Allen v. Camp, 14 Ala. App. 341, 70 So. 290 (1915); Ford v. Glennen, 74 Conn.
6, 49 A. 189 (1901); Cadenhead v. Goodman, 148 Miss. 88, 114 So. 124 (1927); State v. Burke,
114 Wash. 370, 195 P. 16 (1921).
35. Cases cited note 34 supra. Nevertheless, one court has indicated that a dog not engaged in a destructive act may be killed if the dog has been a continuing problem. Wood
v. Stotski, 148 Md. 508, 129 A. 646 (Ct. App. 1925).
36. Kershaw v. McKown, 12 Ala. App. 485, 68 So. 559 (1915). This is the principal case
holding that the relative value of the property must be considered. In Kershaw the dog was
valued at $50 while the goat threatened was worth only $2.
37. Even in these situations the courts require an "urgent necessity" to justify the dog's
destruction. Ford v. Glennen, 74 Conn. 6, 49 A. 189 (1901). In this case the court recognized
that the owner of a cat could kill a trespassing dog to save his own animal. Nevertheless, the
court held the landowner liable because the cat was safely in a tree, and no effort was made
to drive the dog away.
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injury or to notify the owner. Legal consequences may, however, flow from
the accident even though the driver was not negligent. 3
In accidents involving dogs and motor vehicles, the threshold issue arises
of what constitutes driver negligence. In addressing this issue, one court found
a driver negligent when he failed to see the dog prior to striking it, even
though he was driving at a reasonable speed and obeying traffic regulations.3 9
It believed this failure to see indicated the driver was not keeping a proper
lookout. The court further indicated that general negligence principles were
applicable to cases involving such collisions.40
Where the issue of negligence is raised there is often a corollary issue of
contributory negligence. If the dog owner was contributorily negligent, then,
in most states there can be no recovery. 41 In view of the leash and fence law of
most areas, it might appear that an owner would be prima facie contributorily
negligent any time his dog was loose. Nevertheless, in some situations where
the dog jumps the fence or breaks his leash, for example, the owner should
not be held contributorily negligent. In these instances an analogy might be
drawn to Gordon v. Sullivan' 2 where the court found the fact that livestock
was loose insufficient to hold the owner negligent.43 This decision indicates
contributory negligence cannot be established against a plaintiff dog owner
unless it can be shown the dog was ordinarily permitted to run loose, or unless
44
the dog's freedom resulted from inadvertence on the part of the dog owner.
Obviously, such a burden will be difficult for the defendant to sustain.
The focus of an action against the negligent driver lies in establishing that
the driver had a duty to stop after he struck the animal. New Jersey, for example, has specifically provided 45 that any person who is aware he has injured
a domestic animal must stop, ascertain the injuries, and report the accident
to the appropriate police agency or the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
38. The driver may be guilty of a misdemeanor for his failure to stop and such apparent unconcern may open the door for punitive damages in civil actions. CAL.. VHmcLE
CoDE §20002 (West 1959).
39. Griffen v. Fender, 127 Conn. 686, 20 A.2d 95 (1941).
40. Id. For a Florida case stating that the general rules of negligence will apply to cases
in which animals are injured, see Florida East Coast Ry. v. Cain, 210 So. 2d 481 (Ist D.C.A.
Fla. 1968).
41. Lenk v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (1949); Maier v. Randolph, 32 Kan.
340, 6 P. 625 (1885); Mitzel v. Zachman, 219 Minn. 253, 16 N.W.2d 472 (1945). But see
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (1973) where the Florida supreme court abrogated the
contributory negligence defense.
42. 131 So. 2d 520 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
43.

Id. at 522.

44. See City of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Although this
case involved the shooting of a dog, the court pointed out that the dog owner was not
negligent merely because the dog was loose.
45. NJ. STAT. §4:22-25.1 (1971). Specifically, the statute provides: "Each person operating
a motor vehicle who shall knowingly hit, run over, or cause injury to a cat, dog, horse, or
cattle shall stop at once, ascertain the extent of injury, report to the nearest police station,
police officer, or notify the nearest Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and give
his name, address, operator's license and registration number, and also give the location of
the injured animal."
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to Animals. Even though there are criminal penalties for violation of the
provision,4 6 it might also be used in a civil action as a basis for punitive
damages or damages for mental pain and suffering of the owner.
Although the majority of jurisdictions, including Florida, have adopted no
specific statute imposing a duty to stop upon injuring a dog, it may be possible
to impose a duty upon the driver by resorting to more general provisions. The
Florida statutes, for example, require the driver of a vehicle that strikes an
unattended vehicle or other unattended property to stop and notify the property owner of the damageY4 As the dog is considered property under Florida
law, 48 damage to the dog should be within the purview of this provision. This
position finds support in the California decision of People v. Fimbres,49 where
the court found the California general reporting statute 0 requiring drivers to
notify the owner of damage to his property to be applicable to accidents involving injury to dogs.51
Since the standard for driver negligence may be set at a very low threshold,52 the importance of the driver's duty to stop becomes apparent. Under
current Florida law, one may collect punitive damages and damages for
mental pain and suffering only where the dog's injury was the result of malice
or wanton action. 3 In Parkerv. State54 a steer was killed during an attempt to
steal it, and the court inferred malice from the wrongful intent to commit
larceny.55 While failure to stop is not as serious as larceny, it may be argued
that by violating a vehicular code imposing a duty to stop, the driver has
demonstrated a disregard for the dog owner's property rights and personal
feelings sufficient to permit an inference of malice. Whether such an approach
would be successful is completely speculative, but the proposition seems worthy
of contention. In summary, although the law applicable to dog-auto collisions
is still developing, no reason is apparent why traditional negligence principles
should not be applied.56

46. N.J. STAT. §4:22-25.2 (1971). The maximum penalty is 10 days or $50.

47. Specifically, FLA. STAT. §316.063 (1971) provides: "Duty upon striking unattended
vehicles or other property. - The driver of any vehicle which collides with or is involved in
an accident with any vehicle or other property which is unattended resulting in any damage
to such other vehicle or property shall then and there locate and notify the operator or
owner of such vehicle or other property of the name and address of the driver and owner
of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or other property." See FLA. STAT. §§317.081,
.091 (1971) for additional duties of the driver.
48. 197 So. 2d 329 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
49. 107 Cal. App. 778, 288 P. 19 (1930).
50. This provision is now CArL. VEucLE CODE §20002 (West 1959).
51. See People v. Fimbres, 107 Cal. App. 778, 288 P. 19 (1930).
52. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
53. See La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
54. 124 Fla. 780, 169 So. 411 (1936).

55. Id. at 783, 169 So. at 412.
56. See text accompanying notes 107-117 infra.
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Some litigation has also arisen from improper treatment of injured and
sick dogs. The veterinarian, like any professional, is subject to liability for
57
malpractice if he does not perform his services with the required skill.
Veterinary malpractice, however, presents several unique problems. Unlike
his counterpart in the medical field, the veterinarian cannot converse with
his patient, but can only obtain information from the dog's owner. Therefore,
the veterinarian often begins with little, if any, concrete data. 58
In determining liability for malpractice, primary concern centers upon the
standard of care to which the veterinarian is held. Generally, he is bound by
rules similar to those governing physicians and surgeons.59 Additionally, however, the veterinarian is held to certain unique standards. For example, since
each dog will react differently to the clinical atmosphere of the examination
room, 60 the veterinarian must be aware of this peculiarity and that the dog
must be calmed and secured prior to treatment.
Improper Preparationfor Treatment
The veterinarian is under no legal duty to treat any animal.61 Nevertheless,
once he has accepted the duty of treatment, whether gratuitously or for hire,
he becomes liable for any negligence and cannot abandon his obligation with62
out reasonable notice to or prior agreement with the animal owner.
The duty of care begins when the veterinarian first approaches the animal.63 Because of the reaction an animal may have when physically examined,
the veterinarian must take precautions in preparing the dog for treatment. 64
Naturally, every move of the animal need not be anticipated but the veterinarian should realize which actions may startle the animal.65 This requirement was set forth in Beck v. Henkle-Grain Livestock Co.,66 where a veterinarian improperly secured a mule prior to performing an operation. The
mule bolted, thereby receiving serious injuries, and the court held the veterinarian liable for failing to insure that the animal was properly restrained. Although there are no cases involving improper handling of dogs, the reasoning
of the Beck case should apply to any such case.67
57. See Breece v. Ragan, 234 Mo. App. 1093, 138 S.W.2d 758 (1940).
58. Note, Malpractice by Veterinarians,15 CLEV.-MAL, L. Ray. 276, 278 (1966) and sources
cited therein.
59. Storozuk v. W. A. Butler Co., 3 Ohio Misc. 60, 203 N.E.2d 411 (C.P. 1964). See
E. GREENE, THE LAW AND YoUR DOG 101-04 (1969) for discussion of the veterinarian's liability.
60. See Note, supra note 58, at 278.
61. Lathan v. Elrod, 6 Ala. App. 436, 60 So. 428 (1912).
62. Boom v. Reed, 69 Hun 426, 28 N.Y. Supp. 421 (Sup. Ct., 3d Dep't 1893).
63. McNew v. Decatur Veterinary Hosp., Inc., 85 Ga. App. 54, 68 S.E.2d 221 (1951).
64. See Note, supra note 58.
65. Id. at 279.
66. 171 N.C. 698, 88 S.E. 865 (1916).
67. Dogs are examined and treated on narrow metal tables and may become frightened
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ImproperDiagnosisand Treatment
Although a veterinarian cannot question a dog in order to facilitate
diagnosis and treatment, he can question the owner.6 8 Moreover, courts have
held that a veterinarian is under a duty to question the owner carefully concerning symptoms and recent treatments, and liability may be imposed for
failure to make appropriate inquiry.69
Diagnosis, however, is largely a matter of medical judgment and courts are
hesitant to impose liability for mistakes unless the veterinarian's judgment was
dearly unreasonable.7 0 Often there is a diverse opinion as to the proper
diagnosis. 71 In such cases the courts will not impose liability as the veterinarian does not promise infallible judgment but only reasonable opinion.72
In addition, the courts are in agreement that the doctrine of res ipsa Ioquitur
will not apply to the issue of the propriety of diagnosis or treatment.7 3
A veterinarian can also be held liable for the acts of his employees under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.74 In Acherman v. Robertson7 5 a veterinarian was held liable for the act of his helper-son, who mistakenly delivered
the wrong medication to his father. The court found the sufficient agency
relationship between the father and son to impute the son's negligence to the
veterinarian.
In malpractice actions expert testimony is usually required to establish
liability,,6 a requirement that compounds the plaintiff's difficulty in proving
his case. To prove improper diagnosis a plaintiff must demonstrate by expert
testimony that a veterinarian's judgment was extremely improper.7 Since
courts have been reluctant to impose liability for improper diagnosis, it might
be more fruitful for a plaintiff to base his action upon improper handling or
preparation, where expert testimony is not required.7 8 In either situation veterinarians appear to enjoy a better position than the physician or surgeon in a
malpractice action.
DAMAGES

Because the dog is a unique member of the family unit, it might be assumed that substantial damage awards would be justified when the animal is
and attempt escape. The veterinarian could conceivably be held liable for failure to secure
the animal.
68. See Note, supra note 58.
69. Id. at 279-80.
70. E. GRmEEN,
supra note 59, at 104.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Dyess v. Caraway, 190 So. 2d 666 (La. Ct. App. 1966); Storozuk v. WA. Butler Co.,
3 Ohio Misc. 60, 203 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio C.P. 1964).
74. Acherman v. Robertson, 240 Wis. 421, 3 N.W.2d 723 (1942).
75.

Id.

76. See Note, supra note 58, at 284.
77. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra,
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wantonly or maliciously destroyed. With the exception of two states, 9 however, courts limit damages for destruction of dogs to market value and punitive
damages, as if the dog were inanimate property.80 Therefore, depending upon
the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought, damages may include the dog's
market valuesl or special value to the owner,8 2 punitive damages, 83 and compensation for the dog owner's mental pain and suffering.8 4 Additionally, any
veterinary bills arising from treatment of the injury may be recovered.8 5
Market Value or Special Value of the Dog
Those courts holding market value of the dog to be the proper measure of
damages proceed under the theory that the dog owner is made whole if he is
given money with which to purchase an equivalent animal.8 0 Although some
jurisdictions limit recovery solely to market value, where market value can be
ascertained,87 other jurisdictions follow a more liberal view and consider the
market value as only one item of damages.88 In situations where no market
value is ascertainable, some courts also look to the special value of the dog to
its owner.8 9 Factors considered in assessing the dog's value may include the
dog's pedigree,90 its special training,9 1 its character traits, 92 and any other
93
characteristic relevant to its worth.
The use of market value or special value as the sole measure of damages is
inappropriate in that such a standard fails to take into account the relation-

79. La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964); City of Garland
v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Florida and Texas are the only jurisdictions
that allow the dog owner to recover for his mental pain and suffering.
80. Kane v. County of San Diego, 2 Cal. App. 3d 550, 83 Cal. Rptr. 19 (4th Dist. 1969).
81. Melton v. South Shore U-Drive, Inc., 32 App. Div. 950, 303 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't
1969).
82. Kling v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 634 (Ct. App. La. 1962).
83. See, e.g., Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Wright v. Clark,
50 Vt. 130 (1877).
84. Kane v. County of San Diego, 2 Cal. App. 3d 550, 83 Cal. Rptr. 19 (4th Dist. 1969).
85. Brown v. Swindell, 198 So. 2d 432 (Ct. App. La. 1967).
86. St. Louis I.M. & S. Co. v. Philpot, 72 Ark. 23, 77 S.W. 901 (1903); Kane v. San Diego
County, 2 Cal. App. 3d 550, 83 Cal. Rptr. 19 (4th Dist. 1969); Kling v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 635 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Melton v. South Shore U-Drive, Inc., 32 App.
Div. 950, 303 N.Y.S. 751 (2d Dep't 1969).
87. See Kane v. County of San Diego, 2 Cal. App. 3d 550, 83 Cal. Rptr. 19 (4th Dist.
1969).
88. See, e.g., Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Wright v. Clark,
50 Vt. 130 (1877).
89. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Vise, 28 Ala. 263, 78 So. 2d 661 (1955); Wertman v.
Tipping, 166 So. 2d 666 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Bowers v. Horen, 93 Mich. 420, 53 N.W. 535
(1892).
90. Ellis v. Oliphant, 159 Iowa 514, 141 N.W. 415 (1913).
91. Id.
92. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Statton, 306 Ky. 753, 209 S.W.2d 318 (1948) (dog's
ability as a foxhound considered); Uhlein v. Cromack, 109 Mass. 273 (1872) (dog's value as
a watchdog considered).
93. Ellis v. Oliphant, 159 Iowa 514, 141 N.W. 415 (1913).
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ship between a dog owner and his animal.94 Furthermore, in many situations
it may completely preclude recovery. 95
Punitive Damages
In addition to recovering the dog's market value or special value, the plaintiff dog owner may be entitled to collect exemplary damages in those instances
where the defendant's actions demonstrate malice or a wanton disregard for
the dog owner's rights. 96 The importance of this award was apparent in
Parker v. Mise 97 where the court allowed the recovery of punitive damages
notwithstanding a finding that the dog had no pecuniary value. 98
Punitive damages may be appropriate in several situations. One situation
occurs when a trespassing dog has been killed without justification. If the
landowner had insufficient reason to kill the dog, the intentional infliction of
the injury may easily satisfy the requirement of malice or wantonness. 99 A
second possible application of the punitive damage award could arise where
the dog is negligently destroyed by an auto and the driver fails to stop. 109
Malicious or wanton action need not precipitate the dog's injury for
punitive damages to be awarded. Rather it is sufficient if the wrongful conduct
follows the injury. Punitive damages may therefore be assessed for concealment
or other actions that are "indicative of liability."'' 1 For example, in Levine v.
KnowlesI°2 a Florida court found the defendant veterinarian's willful cremation of a dog's body in order to avoid a possible malpractice claim sufficient to
103
justify an award for punitive damages.
Thus punitive damages may flow from any malicious, willful, or wanton
actions of the defendant whether 0 4 or not 05 they were proximately the cause
of the dog's injury. It should not be assumed, however, that exemplary
damages will be available in all cases of intentional injury. Rather, such an
award will depend upon the circumstances of each individual case.
Damages for the Owner's Mental Pain and Suffering
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions do not permit recovery for the
dog owner's mental pain and suffering on the theory that sentimental attach94. Kane v. County of San Diego, 2 Cal. App. 3d 550, 83 Cal. Rptr. 19 (4th Dist. 1969).
95. See text accompanying notes 98-99 infra. If the dog destroyed were a six-year old,
untrained, mixbreed, the dog would have no market or actual value.
96. Kane v. County of San Diego, 2 Cal. App. 3d 550, 83 Cal. Rptr. 19 (4th Dist. 1969).
97. 27 Ala. 480 (1855).
98. Id. at 482.
99. Parker v. Mise, 27 Ala. 480 (1855); Rogers v. Wolf, 195 Iowa 153, 191 N.W. 801
(1923); Heilegmann v. Ruse, 81 Tex. 22, 16 S.W. 931 (1891).
100. See text accompanying notes 38-56 supra.
101. See Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 332.
104. La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
105. See Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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ment has no place in compensation for damaged property. 10 In reaching this
decision one court reasoned "while one's feelings constitute a sentiment, which
we are inclined to value, it is not recognized as an element of damages."' 07
Nevertheless, at least two jurisdictions, Texas1 08 and Florida, 0 9 follow a more
liberal approach and allow the owner's mental pain and suffering to be an
element of damages.
In the case of La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc.110 the Florida
supreme court held that a recovery for mental pain and suffering could be
awarded where the defendant's action was such as to imply malice or otherwise justify an assessment of punitive damages."' In this case an agent of the
defendant, a corporation engaged in garbage removal, struck the dog with a
garbage can. The dog was severely injured and subsequently died. Medical
testimony for the plaintiff indicated the owner had been upset to the point of
hysteria. In upholding the award for mental pain and suffering, the court said
although a dog could not be equated to a child, it did not necessarily follow
that an owner could not suffer anguish from such a loss. 112 La Porte was fol-

lowed in Levine v. Knowles"' where the court implied malice from a veterinarian's actions of disposing of a dog's body in order to avoid an autopsy and
possible malpractice claim."-4 The court found this malice sufficient to uphold
an award of both punitive damages and damages for the owner's mental
anguish. 115
CONCLUSION

Civil actions for the destruction of dogs have largely been ignored by the
legal profession. This inaction is understandable, since most jurisdictions so
limit recovery that it is normally economically impossible to justify incurring
the cost of litigation. This lack of litigation is even more understandable when
one considers that lawyers often work on a contingent fee basis in tort actions.
The Florida courts, however, now permit the full range of damage recovery," 6
thus making actions for injury or destruction of dogs worth an attorney's
time. With this severe economic impediment removed, actions by dog owners
should be greatly facilitated.
Nevertheless, the void in the Florida statutory and case law concerning

106. Allen v. Camp, 14 Ala. App. 341, 70 So. 290 (1915); Kling v. United States Fire Ins.
Co., 146 So. 2d (La. Ct. App. 1962); Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Store, 38 N.M. 502, 35 P.2d 978

(1934).
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Smith v. Palace Transp. Co., 142 Misc. 93, 94, 253 N.Y.S. 87, 88 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1931).
City of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 267-68.
See Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 332.
See text accompanying notes 88-117 supra,
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